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STILL FACING "THE DILEMMA OF THE FACT": GILLIGAN
AND HABERMAS (RE)VISITED
MYRA BOOKMAN*

[T]he "dilemma of the fact": that in the experience of life choices, no
single perspective could adequately encompass the problem .. has
been consistently mistaken ...for a retreat from the adolescent cog-

nitive apogee-in this case from the principled morality of Kohlberg's highest stages.'
Facts trouble. They persistently and stubbornly trouble attempts to
universalize higher order thinking, to justify moral norms, and to defend
formal legal equality. Habermas in Between Facts and Norms' shoots at
the trouble, but like his predecessors he doesn't quite mitigate it. The
same recalcitrant "lifeworld" or sociological facts that plague Habermas
also continually trouble the universalizing claims of Freud, Piaget, and
Kohlberg, a few of Habermas's theoretical fathers. And like them,
Habermas refuses to relinquish a model of psychological and social development that relies on autonomy, separation, and individuation as its
ground note. Reliance on such models for the legitimation of law translates into a faqade of legal neutrality that is "functionally biased" and
fails to address the dilemma of the "facts" that arise out of difference?
Incorporation of Carol Gilligan's' work enriches the substantive base of
Habermas's legitimation enterprise without forfeiting its theoretical elegance, essential logic, or structural integrity.
Gilligan's reformulation of moral development theory and the rhetoric of rights provides a correction toward a critique and reinterpretation
of dominant legal doctrine without losing validity claims or reverting to a
crude contextual relativism. Mary Joe Frug suggests a "progressive
reading" of Gilligan's research not for the purpose of privileging
women's approach to life or the law or to compare legal treatment of
* Assistant Director of Graduate Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Colorado at Denver. Visiting Scholar, Harvard University 1991-1993; Ph.D. 1983, University of Colorado at Boulder.
1. Carol Gilligan & John Michael Murphy, Development from Adolescence to Adulthood:
The Philosopher and the Dilemma of the Fact, in INTELLECrUAL DEVELOPMENT BEYOND
CHILDHOOD 85, 96 (Deanna Kuhn ed., 1979).
2. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs: CoNTRIBuIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
3. See Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim "A Different
Voice"?, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 37-38 (1992), reprinted in POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM
30, 30 (1992).
4. CAROL GILIuGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
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men and women through case reviews. Rather it is to show how "lifeworld" or experiential differences, in this case gender-linked, can provide clues to the invisible undergirdings of the dominant interpretations
of the law and offer keys to critique and change. Just as Gilligan's work
underwrites a transformation in philosophical moral theory and psychological development theory, it can also serve legal theory. By tracing a
developmental path through women's criteria for moral justifications,
she introduces a previously unnoticed line of moral development, the
now well known "care voice." The findings reveal that Kohlberg's
stages--derived from an all-male sample-tell only a partial story.
Heretofore unrepresented experiences are shown by Gilligan's work to
be "facts" or content that cognitive reflection abstracts into a set of previously untheorized principles, that is, new forms! New subjects, new
"facts," new interpretations expose the hidden uniformity of assumptions
behind moral, legal, and developmental "universals." Space opens for
recognizing that different figurative content spawns different formal
structures. The "postconventional" thinking that Gilligan proposes is just
such a form. It is contextual, yet neither relative, unreflective, nor devoid
of consistent justificatory claims. It arises out of a lifeworld fraught with
attachment, vulnerability, and relational responsibility-a lifeworld beyond ego, separation, and blind fairness.
My purposes in writing this essay are pedagogical and rhetorical as
well as experimental. I attempt to inform and convince, but I also sketch
the outline of new connections. As a cognitive-developmental psychologist cum social theorist, I first demonstrate, in section one, how Habermas links morality and law through a theoretical reliance on "developmental logic" specified by Piaget, and then elaborated by Kohlberg. In
section two, I show how this theoretical ancestry inadvertently supports
Freudian notions of the originary self-serving id. Such implicit support
invisibly scaffolds existing normative hierarchies and legitimates
Habermas's "normative substantive values"---democracy, autonomy,
equality--despite his claims to a postmetaphysical, strictly procedural,
normatively empty position.! Finally, in section three, I suggest that Gil5.
6.

See Frug, supra note 3, at 52-53.
GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 62-63.

7.

See STEPHEN K. WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OF JORGEN HABERMAS: REASON, JUSTICE

AND MODERNITY 66-68 (1988) (summarizing Kohlberg's stages and their relationship to Habermas's work),
8. My analysis of Gilligan's theory is based on Jean Piaget's extensive admonitions regarding the correlation between particular content and the nature of its resulting form. See JEAN PIAGET,
STRUCruRALISM 136-37 (Chaninah Maschler ed. & trans., 1970). The false dichotomy, form vs.
substance/content, classically privileges form as an abstract procedural ideal emptied of substance,
which refers to particular empirical events. "[Lliberal law presently draws predominantly from the
form side of the form/substance dichotomy." Note, The Myth of Context in Politics and Law, 110
HARV. L. REv. 1292, 1301 (1997).
9. See Mathieu Deflem, Introduction to Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action, in
HABERMAS, MODERNITY AND LAW 1, 9 (Mathieu Deflem ed., 1996).
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ligan's reformulations are consistent with the developmental logic with
which Habermas has impressive affinities. But her findings broaden the
substantive foundations on which his work rests. Specifically, I argue
that impartiality,reciprocity,and solidarity are justifiable, but particular,
outcomes of particular "social facts." Different social facts can result in
different, but equally justifiable, "postconventional" norms. Concluding
remarks weave the discussion back into the law and show that principles
of "care" neither replace those of "justice," nor are subsumed under
them. Rather they coexist in productive tension."
I. MORALITY AND LAW-THE "POSTCONVENTIONAL"

Habermas draws heavily on Kohlberg's "postconventional" morality, which in turn depends on Piaget's "decentered" subject whose maturity is measured by her ability to apply formal logic to moral problems
and whose thinking is not polluted by particulars of local conventional
life." According to Habermas, an analogous evolutionary process describes a "rationalization of the lifeworld" that is necessary for valid law
"through a separation of law and morality, and of public and private
law.... a separation achieved at the post-conventional level of social
evolution." 2 A strictly procedural discourse based on formal pragmatic
rules of language ensures that such separations are sustained through
abstract conditions of universalism. But despite his claims of a "strictly
procedural" approach, substantive values steeped in assumptions of
functional equality and autonomy lurk. Habermas seems to counterpoise
his profound apprehensions about parochial blindness with a blind faith
in a rational autonomous subject. But this hypothetical mature subject
whose sensitivity to particulars should be trumped by justice and fairness
doesn't match the developmental "facts," whether that subject is a man
or a woman. In other words, the traditional formal separation between an
ethics of practical life and a higher more abstract morality (where the
latter subsumes the former) continues to trouble attempts to translate
justification into application.
Both Piaget and Kohlberg reconsider this problem in their later
work when empirical evidence continually reveals the reentry of "reality," "commitment," and "responsibility" in late adolescents and young
adults who had previously achieved the "postconventional" stage. The
standing framework requires this to appear as a regression to conventional morality. 3 Kohlberg addresses the problem with a scoring revision
that increases the formal requirements of the highest stages. Gilligan departs in another direction-a direction that may align better with Piaget
who supports the correlativity of form and content and the limitations of
10. See Axel Honneth, The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS 289,319 (Stephen K. White ed. 1995).
11. See HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 71.
12. Deflem, supra note 9, at 6-7.
13. See Gilligan & Murphy, supra note 1, at 90.
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formalization. He writes, "[Tihere is no 'form as such' or 'content as
such,' that each element-from sensory-motor acts through operations to
theories-is always simultaneously form to the content it subsumes and
content for some higher form."'" Gilligan demonstrates the key role of
particularsocial experiences in the process of moral development and
how those experiences of subjectivity constitute content. This diverse
content gives birth to diverse but not infinite structural forms. Pluralistic
"lifeworlds" in the late-twentieth-century world demand a theory open to
diverse experience, yet one that remains loyal to a "developmental logic"
that holds validity claims.
Frug threads this back to the law when she suggests that when interpreted "progressively," Gilligan provides a "strategy of difference" to
circumvent legal moves that in the guise of formal equality are detrimental to subordinated groups. 5 By "progressively," she seems to indicate the importance of the above understanding-that this is not about
affectivity vs. reason, or contextualism vs. absolutism, or the quotidian
vs. the higher-order, but about how abstract justifications applied to concrete circumstances harbor within them hidden substance and are not
formally pure. The next section explores the substantive beliefs that support the so-called normatively empty forms that Habermas assumes in his
communicative ethics. Legal rhetoric of justice and rights, like its handmaidens and interpreters-philosophy, psychology, and social theorypresupposes the same substantive beliefs.
II. NORMATIVE HIERARCHIES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
Kohlberg formalizes "postconventional" justice by explicitly drawing on Kant, Piaget, Mead, and Rawls. He points to a "moral point of
view" that involves "impartiality" and "reversibility"'" as necessary aspects of "cognitivism, universalism, and formalism."'7 Habermas, when
proposing communicative ethics as an ameliorative for some of Kohlberg's theoretical problems, suggests that "strategic action" and "normatively regulated action" constitute the two directions of cognitive restructuring.'8 They operate on an egocentric "preconventional morality"
on the path toward "conventional morality" until the individual "decenters" and differentiates "between lifeworld and world" to emerge as postconventionally moral. 9 In this section, I want to submit a sketch that sets
the scene for my contentions in section III, where I (1) expose "imparti14. PIAGET, supra note 8, at 35.
15. Frug, supra note 3, at 49.
16. Lawrence Kohlberg, JusticeAs Reversibility, in I ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT 190
(1981).
17. JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 116-68
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans., 1996). Here Habermas argues for subsuming
Gilligan's "care ethic" under criteria for "justice." See id at 176-81.
18. Id. at 141-56.
19. Id. at 138-41.
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ality" and "reversibility" (moral reciprocity) as one important outcome of
cognitive operations but not the necessary outcome, and (2) outline how
"strategic action" and "normatively regulated action" can be substantively different for differently socially situated subjects and therefore can
provide different contents upon which cognition operates to result in new
forms.
I shudder to "psychologize" to an audience of philosophers, social
theorists, and legal scholars. But in order to ground my comments, I
must. Consider it an excursus. Piaget explicitly relies (and therefore
Kohlberg and Habermas implicitly rely) on traditional Freudian notions
of originary egoism, tempered by encounters with reality and cultural
norms, culminating in separation and detachment as developmental
goals. This defines a trajectory that translates into "reciprocity"°or "solidarity" 2' as moral ideals-a stance that "always refers back to the self."
Gilligan presupposes a different originary scene. In an alternative construction she draws upon John Bowlby's twist on psychoanalytic theory.23
Bowlby places attachment at the center of psychological growth and castigates the trend toward valorization of separation, detachment, and disengagement, which he viewed as fraught with pathogenic potential. Gilligan extends this danger to civilization itself.
Contemporary empirical evidence corroborates infantile response to
connection and relationship.' Traditional psychological theories neglect
this dimension of human psychology and concentrate instead on the
egoistic dimension where perceptions of inequality and oppression subsume the human psyche. These perceptions, an important aspect of human psychology, force attention towards ideals of reciprocal rights and
equal respect. They reflect a need for "justice" criteria. But a "care perspective" responds to an equally primordial, albeit neglected, human
vulnerability-"problems of detachment or abandonment [that] hold up
an ideal of attention and response to need."' Both dimensions are equally
affective and potentially subject to cognitive reconstruction toward "de-

20.
21.
PHIL. F.
22.

Id. at 122.
JUrgen Habermas, Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning "Stage 6," 21
47 (1989-90).
Carol Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of Self in Relationship, in

MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL

THEORY AND EDUCATION 3, 6 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988).
23. See id. at 10; see also JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: ATTACHMENT (1969);
JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: SEPARATION, ANXIETY AND ANGER (1973).
24. See LYN MIKEL BROWN & CAROL GILLIGAN, MEETING AT THE CROSSROADS 5 (1992);
DANIEL N. STERN, THE INTERPERSONAL WORLD OF THE INFANT: A VIEW FROM PSYCHOANALYSIS

AND DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 203-26 (1985) (hypothesizing and describing four infant
"senses of self"); Lynne Murray & Colwyn Trevarthen, Emotional Regulation of Interactions Between Two-Month-Olds and Their Mothers, in SOCIAL PERCEPTION ININFANTS 177, 180 (Tiffany M.
Field & Nathan A. Fox eds., 1985) (discussing how young infants imprint to particular caregivers).
25. Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, Two Moral Orientations: Gender Differences and Similarities,34 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 223, 225 (1988).
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centered" ends. Both aspects are present in young children and are not
sex-linked. They often become gender-associated through gender soaked
cultural expectations and conventional norms. Societal structures sanction many boys to bury attachment and express individuation, while a
preponderance of girls internalize mechanisms aimed at preventing the
loss of attachment.' This is not a theory about innate differences, nor is it
one that valorizes emotion over reason, particulars over absolutes, or
women over men. Frug's admonitions about the dangers of a "crude Gilliganism" applied to the law are germane here. She warns that "vulgarization of Gilligan's book has been a catastrophe for feminists. Ripped
from the context ...[it] los[es] its edge as a disruption of previous research methods or a challenge to existing normative hierarchies."'
Mainstream psychology normalizes existing hierarchies. Therefore
when "the dilemma of the fact" appears-when particularism and benevolence appear to override absolute fairness-it is read as a "regression" rather than as a sophisticated moral form underwritten by the universal injunction "to do the least harm." Gilligan's research, coupled with
her theoretical assumptions that designate attachments as originary moments along with egoism, allow her to reject the interpretation of this
apparent dilemma as a regression. Instead it becomes an adult equilibration of the prior adolescent "egocentric belief in the omniscient capacity
of formal logic" and represents a "postconventional morality of care." A
fresh framework rescues the "fact" from "dilemma" and elevates it to a
positive outcome-a moral stage that transcends both the impediments of
conventional ethical life and the empty formalisms of abstract reason and
replaces both with an awareness of need and avoidance of detachment.
Yet, in agreement with philosophers such as Levinas and Derrida with
whose work Gilligan appears not to have familiarity, she places equality
and justice on an equal plane with an ethic of care." Each moral justification responds to pivotal, but different, notes of human psychologyseparation and attachment. The transcendental subject of pure reason,
mythologized at least since Kant, vanishes once tradition suspends disbelief that both self and attachment form an originary affect on which
cognition operates but does not vanquish.

26.

See NANcY CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 108-10 (1989).
27. Mary Joe Frug, Sexual Equality and Sexual Difference in American Law, 26 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 665,673 n.26 (1992) (emphasis added).
28. Gilligan & Murphy, supranote 1,at 86.
29. See Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 25, at 224-25; see also Honneth, supra note 10, at
319 (commenting on the inadequacy of modern law to deal with the question of "care"). Hormeth
also presents a discussion of the problems with Habermas's attempt to mediate between the two
moral principles with discourse ethics. For Honneth, as with Gilligan, "care" is a necessary counterpoint to justice.
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III. IMPARTIAuTY, RECIPROCITY, SOLIDARITY As OUTCOMES OF
SPECIFIC FACTS AND NORMS

The singular ego that encounters the other as "object" or alter ego
levels all others to ancillary variations of himself. Habermas's moral alternative to justice, "solidarity," rests on this foundation. For Habermas,
"the perspective complementing that of equal treatment of individuals is
not benevolence but solidarity.... [E]ach person must take responsibility for the other because as consociates all must have an interest in the
integrity of their shared life context in the same way." The other is an
object of "reciprocity"-concern for others is given equally to all. There
is no privileging or asymmetry. We take the role of the other to ensure
our shared communal life. The other is the object of "reversibility"-the
sine qua non of the orthodox Piagetian stance combining autonomy and
formal logic.' Piaget links moral reciprocity to the development of formal logical structures-transformations applied to propositions-in this
case, reversibility. "IT]he logical act consists essentially of operating,
hence of acting on things and toward people."32
Habermas, like Piaget and Kohlberg, has been roundly criticized for
emptying people of content and for relegating substance to mere affectivity and particularism. But these theorists have not emptied their subjects. Instead they fill them with substance that commentators from Karl
Marx, Hannah Arendt, and Carol Gilligan to contemporary political and
legal theorists describe in various ways.3 Until recently, this was a substance so elusive as to be nearly invisible, so rooted is it in our intellectual tradition. Habermas, Piaget, and Kohlberg all assume a psychology
and developmental trajectory that is rife with substantive content--content that limits their observation, interpretation, and prediction of lifeworld facts and social norms. An originary narcissistic ego is tacitly construed, one that is non-social and non-rational. Fears of inequality and
oppression eventually drive rationality and socially directed thinking.
Hence, "impartiality, reciprocity, solidarity"--engagement with a generalized other to ensure individual fairness coupled with survival of a
shared community---emerge as valued, anything but neutral, outcomes of
this imagined journey of the lone ego. Our constitutional scheme as well
as liberalism in general presupposes the same self that these outcomes

30. Habennas, supra note 21, at 47.
31. See PIAGET, supra note 8, at 136-37.
32. JEAN PIAGET, SIX PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 121 (David Elkind ed. & Anita Tenzer trans.,
1967).
33. See Seyla Banhabib, The Debate over Women and Moral Theory Revisited, in FEMINISTS
READ HABERMAS: GENDERING THE SUBJECT OF DISCOURSE 181, 182-93 (Johanna Meehan ed.,
1995) (exploring the implications of Gilligan's research for universalist moral philosophy) [hereinafter FEMINISTS READ HABERMAS]; Jodi Dean, Discourses in Different Voices, in FEMINISTS READ
HABERMAS, supra, at 205, 220-25 (introducing the notion of an "orientation toward connection," to
fill out Habermas's account of moral development).
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assume-a view of self that limits both questions and answers about democracy, constitutionalism, and judicial review.'
Lev Vygotsky, early-twentieth-century Russian psychologist, provides me with a transition to write about a different, equally cognitive
but less rationalistic and detached, outcome through his recognition of
Piaget's shortcomings. Vygotsky proves to be a good stand-in interpreter
for me because his work never involved gender differences. Nevertheless
he saw the limiting metaphysics in which Piaget, like Freud, was mired,
and presented an alternative to which Gilligan's much later work can be
related. Vygotsky. places the social at the center of development, the
originary moment. Whereas Piaget's child overcomes egocentrism with
social language and pure thought, Vygotsky's child isfirst connected and
social. Knowing at all levels is born of interaction, activity, socialitythe "interpsychological." The bifurcated world of inner-outer is anathema
to him. Piaget, Vygotsky tells us, gives the narcissistic ego an independent metaphysical beginning, which forces him to represent realistic
thinking as "completely severed from the real needs, interests, and
wishes of the organism, that is, as pure thought."'"
Habermas, too, avoids severing inner from outer world and mitigates
the problem of "pure thought" by keeping the lifeworld in play-both individual and societal. He holds that paths toward legitimate norms,
whether in moral development, social evolution or law, consist of continual cognitive reconstructions of the experienced world. For Habermas, as
with Vygotsky, language serves as the lynchpin of this process. But for all
these similarities, Vygotsky's initial condition of all transformations, "social .speech," takes the more Piagetian form of inner egocentric thinking
for Habermas. The social aspect maps on later, in Habermas's view, and
culminates in the honing of language and the pragmatics of discourse as
the medium of understanding and universalizing in the "postconventional"
moment. However, two contrasting types of actions, "strategic action" and
"normatively regulated action" precede the postconventional maturity that
secures universal legitimate norms for Habermas. These motivations or
"actions" enter at the crossroads where the child's egoistic development
meets "conventional" morality. Self-interest drives behavior and conventional norms constrain it until an individual (or a culture) "thematizes" the
latter to set it off from the lifeworld. To achieve such a "decentered understanding" requires that
a hypothetical attitude is introduced. Before the reflective
gaze ...the social world dissolves into so many conventions in need
of justification. The empirical store of traditional norms is split into

34. Cf Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1690-94
(1997).
35. Lev Vygotsky, The Problem of Speech and Thinking in Piaget's Theory, in 1 COLLECr-D
WORKS OF L.S. VYGOrSKY 53, 77 (Robert W. Rieber & Aaron S.Carton eds., 1987).
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social facts and norms. The latter have lost their backing in the certainties of the lifeworld and must now be justified in the light of principles. Thus the orientation to principles of justice and ultimately to
the procedure of norm-justifying discourse is the... inevitable moralization of a social world become problematic. Such are the ideas of
justice that, at the postconventional stage, take the place of conformity to roles and norms.6
But "social facts and norms" constitute differently for different
groups and therefore provide different motivations for strategic action. In
addition, different conventional expectations offer a different focus for
the "reflective gaze" and "norm-justifying discourse." Gilligan's inclusion of girls and women in moral justification studies, which had previously only included boys and men, provides a potent example of such
differences. Her empirical findings, commensurate with the theory of
originary attachment, suggest that girls often strategically avoid detachment since the social injunctions to separate are not as operative as they
are with boys. This form of "strategic action" works in conjunction with
conventional norms of self-sacrificial "female goodness" until conflicts
about equality and fairness emerge and force cognitive reconstructions of
moral dilemmas and justifications. Notions of impartiality enter and demand the subject's recognition of herself as a subject. She understands
the logical grounds for the conflict-principles of fairness to self against
those of unconditional maintenance of relationship 37-and struggles with
the resulting tension. In a move toward what Gilligan names "postconventional care," this social actor refuses to relinquish the moral injunction to stay attached. She rejects a detached application of reversibility
operations to others but instead justifies her acts based on an awareness
of need, her own, that of the other, and of non-violence to the relationship. Autonomy, symmetry, ability to take the role of the other, or "what
the other means to me" do not drive this morality." Yet it responds to
issues of fairness. "Do the least harm to self and others," expresses the
universal norm-justifying validity claim of this discourse. Different lifeworld contents produce different postconventional forms. "Principles of
care" should be added to complement "principles of justice" in the
Habermas passage above, but should never be subsumed under them.
Postconventional "care" is cognitive, principled, and the result of a "reflective gaze."

36. HABERMAS, supra note 17, at 165.
37. See BROWN & GILuGAN, supra note 24, at 177-81 (providing descriptions of either-or
framing of "selfish or selfless, self or relationship" as a constructive tension toward potential resolution of conventional norms that dictate such dichotomies).
38. It should be made clear that this is not a response based on empathy, being able to exchange oneself for the other or "walking in the others' shoes." Rather it is a genuine disinterested
response and responsibility to another simply rooted in need. See iL at 38 (describing this distinction as one rarely made in the psychological literature).
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Tradition relegates empirical differences or "facts" that are anomalous within the prevailing theory to mere particularism or relativism,
regression or immaturity, or affectivity. That is, to content-as opposed
to universalform or reason. This tradition impedes theories of legal and
political legitimacy as it has moral philosophy for centuries. The importation of Carol Gilligan's findings and interpretations into Habermas's
project palliates the serious consequences of this "'rationalist' bias,"
which "abstract[s] away from the embedded, contingent, and finite aspects of human beings" ... [and] neglect[s] . . .the contingent beginnings of moral personality." Yet, the inclusion of Gilligan's view does
not destroy the cognitivism that Habermas requires for legitimacy based
on Piaget's "developmental logic" driven by the "reflective gaze." In this
essay, I show how the experiences of differently situated subjects provide "facts" or figurative content on which Piagetian reflexive abstraction operates to create forms that correlate to that content. "At each level,
formalization of a given content is limited by the nature of this content;'"
"form and content are correlatives, not absolutes."' Gilligan describes
two dimensions of early relationship, perceptions of autonomy/inequality
and of attachment, each of which constitutes originary content. Depending on individual situatedness and cultural factors, social norms selectively highlight and transform each dimension into differentiated objects
of the "reflective gaze." When the first dimension-autonomy, inequality, detachment-is foregrounded, "principles of justice" instantiated
through "impartiality" and offset by "reciprocity and solidarity" represent logical formal outcomes. But when attachment is theoretically recognized as equally foundational content, and is then cognitively transformed, "principles of care" logically emerge as another consequent set
of formal justifications that define mature moral development. Both outcomes are cognitive, result from operations on originary affect and on
conventional norms, and require equal "decentration" from the moral
injunctions of a parochial lifeworld.
Critiques of formal equality models and of the liberal self as legitimate frameworks for law abound, especially from feminist legal scholars. Yet "limited cross-fertilization" has occurred between these critics
and constitutional theory and studies of legal legitimacy.' Tracy Higgins
unpacks the debate between democracy and feminism by suggesting that
"liberalism's emphasis on individualization may constitute a normative
claim about the value of individuation rather than a descriptive claim

39. Seyla Benhabib, In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current
Controversiesin PracticalPhilosophy, 21 THE PHILOSOPHCAL FORUM 1, 21 (1989-1990).
40. PiAGET, supra note 8,at 35-36.
at 28.
41. Id.
42. Higgins, supra note 34, at 1660.
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about the self."' 3 Moreover, she adds that critiques of liberalism simply
present an alternative normative claim bolstered by complementary descriptive claims of the self, which should inform an analysis of alternative structures to assess legal policy. The interpretation of Gilligan's
work presented here provides both theoretical and empirical support toward such an analysis without reducing alternatives to crude contextualism or false oppositions that frame affect against thought.
Gilligan's logic like that of Piaget and Kohlberg retains validity
claims by assuming that cognitive reflection yields moral competence
through increased decentration from conventional norms and unexamined emotivism. While the "postconventional morality" she describes
refuses detachment from the relational "facts" of everyday life, it requires justificatory claims. In a lifeworld where attachment figures as
centrally as individualism, developmental reflection operates on that
attachment and transforms it into a "postconventional" morality in which
human connection plays as a counterpoint to the individual. The theory
reworks assumptions about originary egoism, proposes different frameworks for problem solving, and new possibilities for competence criteria.
Alternative standards resist both disengagement and total submission of
self while upholding responsibility for the suppressed or vulnerable
other. A morality of "care" neither replaces a morality of "justice," nor is
subsumed under it. They coexist as "bifocalities'-living in a productive tension." Gilligan's theory provides normative claims to complement
those of classical liberalism and simultaneously assists Habermas's rescue mission-saving lifeworld "facts" from obliteration by transcendental moral norms without sacrificing reliable justification. It expands the
departure point for Habermas's journey toward "postmetaphysical
thinking."

43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1692.
See Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 25.
See Honneth, supra note 10, at 316.

